How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? by Ernst Fehr

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Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English


Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementErnst Fehr, Oliver D. Hart, Christian Zehnder
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 17545, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 17545.
ContributionsHart, Oliver D., Zehnder, Christian, National Bureau of Economic Research
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1
The Physical Object
FormatElectronic resource
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL25173138M
LC Control Number2011657454

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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?* Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore ()’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal. How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?   Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features Cited by: IZA DP No. How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart, Christian Zehnder Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore ()’s theory of contractual reference points.

Here we show that the central behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust to such considerations. Our data reveal that informal agreements can mitigate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility but they do not fully resolve the problem of misaligned reference by: Hart and Moore () point out that the idea of managing reference points through informal agreements has some force, but they argue that asymmetric information in combination with self-serving biases may limit the impact of such agreements considerably. Our results illustrate that (at least in certain environments) asymmetric information is. Downloadable (with restrictions)! The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority, and delegation. Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex-post. of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex-post renegotiation or revision. Here we show that the central behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust to such considerations. Our data reveal that informal agreements can mitigate the trade-off between.

Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore ()’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. BibTeX @MISC{Fehr11oflaborhow, author = {Ernst Fehr and Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder and Ernst Fehr and Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder}, title = {of LaborHow Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?}, year = {}}. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? Authors: Fehr, Ernst Hart, Oliver Zehnder, Christian. Year of Publication: Series/Report no.: Working Paper